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Shelley and Berkeley: 
The Platonic Connection 
All things exist as they are perceived — at least in relation to the 
percipient. "The mind is its own place, and in itself Can make a 
Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven." But poetry defeats the curse 
which binds us to be subjected to the accident of surrounding 
impressions. And whether it spreads its own figured curtain, or 
withdraws life's dark veil from before the scene of things, it equally 
creates for us a being within our being. 
P. B. Shelley, A Defence of Poetry 
It is evident that the tilings I perceive are my own ideas, and that no 
idea can exist unless it be in a mind. Nor is it less plain that mese 
ideas or things by me perceived, either themselves or their 
archetypes, exist independently of my mind, since I know myself not 
to be their author, it being out of my power to determine at pleasure, 
what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon opening my eyes 
and ears. They must therefore exist in some other mind, whose will it 
is they should be exibited to me. 
George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous 
The fundamental Lockean premise that the human mind can only perceive 
ideas (and not reality) is differentiated by Berkeley1 in making these "ideas" 
not "signs" of a material unknowable substance, but "ectypes" of God's 
objects of thought2. Berkeley's "ectypal" ideas form a logical, if not 
ontological, link, I would suggest, between the "innate ideas" of tradition 
and the Lockean "ideas of sensation", because whereas they are timely-
imprinted, co-existent with perception, yet they are potentially pre-existent 
in the mind of the deity, and "eternally" perceived by God. The Lockean 
material substance as primary cause of our "mental imprints" is substituted 
by the Berkeleyan immaterial substance. 
The contradiction that Berkeley detects in Locke's conception of matter, 
in that an "unthinking" and insensible cause should be able to generate 
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'Ideas" by acting upon mind, constitutes the basic premise for his adoption 
of an all-spiritual reality, thus establishing a system in which man finds 
himself alone with God in the universe3. What Berkeley in fact does, is 
retain the central epistemologica! "event" of the Lockean theory (mind-
being-acted-upon)4, while changing the nature of the substratum, the ground 
of existence, from a material to a spiritual principle5. Berkeley's theory of 
esse ist percipi , by making the idea (perceived by the mind) of man an 
ectype of the archetype (idea in the mind) of the Author of nature, retains 
the Lockean set up of a mind-as-text "stamped" or "written upon" in the 
perceptual "act" (or "passion"). Also, by making the mind's own wilful 
activity, "thinking" or "imagination", a faint by-product of sense6 ( as 
precisely Hobbes had done, calling imagination "faded sense"), Berkeley's 
immaterialism accords to mind (human mind) a position and function similar 
to that occupied in the materialistic systems of Hobbes and Locke. So the 
Imagination (exercise of man's will) is subservient and inferior to Sense 
(exercise of God's will), and becomes only a "copy" of the "real things" that 
constitute the content of mind in perception7; apparently, human 
intentionality, when interfering with divine voluntarism, introduces a 
component of "errancy" in what was originally systematic, lively, steady, 
and consistent. 
Berkeley's ontological universe thus consists of two perceiving subjects 
(God/Man), and the objects perceived (mental ideas), forming all one 
spiritual reality with various gradations of vividness. In sensation, man 
perceives the ideas of God (or rather copies of the divine originals), whereas 
in the mental activities that follow upon perception (reflection, memory, 
imagination), he deals with faint reproductions of sensory images that are 
the human mind's own poor product, thrice removed from the divine 
moulds8. With Berkeley, sensation is not only the presupposition of all 
knowledge, but the highest activity of the mind, since it is then that the 
human and the divine come in their closest rapport. So what Berkeley really 
effects, is to transform the Author writing on the Human Text9 from a 
Corporeal to a Spiritual Substance; the mind of man in both cases remains a 
blank page, passively awaiting inscription. 
It becomes fairly obvious, I think, that whereas the polemic of Locke was 
directed against the "innate ideas" of Platonic theology and attempted to 
liberate the mind from subservience to "transcendent" (and human) 
authority, Berkeley's contention, by accepting "ideas" as "innate" with God, 
while asserting that "no idea can exist man in a mind", is also subversive of 
Plato's conception of the Ideas as abiding separately from divine or human 
intelligence. So, there appear to be three loci of ideas: for Plato a place 
"apart" (where forms dwell "just by themselves" [Parmenides, 129d] )10, for 
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Locke and Hume the mind of man (produced by an exterior material reality 
or from unknown causes), and for Berkeley (still within the tradition of 
Christian Platonism) the mind of God, from whence they are imprinted upon 
the mind of man in perception. 
Was Berkeley a Platonist, a pseudo-Platonist, or an anti-Platonist? All 
three propositions have been supported, concerning his relation to Plato. 
What in fact we have, I believe, is yet another version of Platonism, or to be 
more specific, of Neoplatonism; and if we go by the norm of the Platonic 
dialogues, we would rather classify Berkeley with Locke's "new way of 
ideas" than with Plato's old way. The Berkeleyan "idea", as we have seen, is 
as closely associated with sense experience as is the Lockean, and in this 
Berkeley places himself in a counter position from Plato's. It is true, of 
course, that both Berkeley and Plato hold non-materialist positions in 
advancing the supremacy of mind, and this constitutes a common 
denominator that allows for their being grouped together. It is equally true, 
however, that Plato admits the existence of a reality other-raan-Mmd/Spirit 
in his ontological model ("for the creation of this world is the combined 
work of necessity and mind" [Timaeus, 47e-48a] ), which gives his system a 
dualistic colouring absent from Berkeley's monistic metaphysics; as it is also 
true that Plato's epistemology demands at a certain point the rejection of 
sense-data as incompetent to lead man to knowledge of the Ideas, the senses 
capturing only shadows of reality — those things which "can be seen but not 
thought, while the ideas can be thought but not seen" (Republic, VI, 507b). 
For Berkeley, as indicated, knowledge is based on sense-perception, the 
senses being man's most direct channel into the "archetypal" ideas as seen 
by God. So to Plato's "objective realistic idealism" Berkeley counterposes a 
"subjective idealistic realism". 
The proposition that a careful reading of Berkeley's work shows a "very 
gradual process in which, as if carried by an irresistible inner impetus, he 
brings himself more and more under the spell of the Platonic tradition", may 
be acceptable on the common ontological presuppositions that underlie both 
the Neoplatonic and Berkeleyan world models; but to "think of Berkeley 
himself as a passage or movement — the passage from Locke to Plato"11 is, 
I believe, a gross injustice to all three philosophers involved. Berkeley, it 
appears, never grew out of Locke and into Platonism; he rather developed 
the full implications of a doctrine he had endorsed right from the beginning, 
crystallizing his epistemology into a cosmology. And the system or structure 
of reality that is the object of his inquiry in Siris, is precisely the one called 
the "laws of nature" in The Principles of Human Knowledge, "the set rules 
or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the 
ideas of sense"12. That Berkeley should read his own interpretation of reality 
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into Plato is too common a practice with post-Platonic philosophers to 
surprise us; evidently, the same attitude is to be found in some of his own 
readers, including Alexander C. Fraser, the editor of Berkeley's works, 
whose comment on the Siris, that it "breathes the spirit of Plato and the 
Neoplatonists in the least Platonic generation of English history since the 
revival of letters, and it extracts this Platonic spirit from a thing of sense so 
commonplace as tar"13, is indicative of a misreading of Plato similar to 
Berkeley's. Nor is the statement that follows fully justified, that in passing 
from the Principles to Siris14, "we are transported from Locke to Plato, and 
find revived the ancient conception of gradation in existence, and of the 
constant animation of the universe"15. Berkeley never quite inhabited the 
same ontological space with Locke or Plato (who, by sharing in premises of 
dualism and scepticism are, in a way, closer to each other than Berkeley to 
either of them). Berkeley's immaterialism is a blending of Christianity and 
Neoplatonism16, or a new version of the basic dogmas of Platonic theology; 
his one and only first cause, the Author of Nature, is an "inscribing" God 
duplicating the deity of "scriptural" revelation. 
The pervading eighteenth-century image of the mind as a "lazy" or in any 
case "inactive" onlooker upon the "magnificent spectacle" that God paints 
on our senses, is dominant in Berkeley's philosophy. Or, transposing the 
metaphor from the field of the visual arts to that of linguistic science, the 
mind is again passively instructed in the divine discource, reading and 
interpeting, but never exercising any form of initiative17. This model 
radically contradicts Plato's impassioned, wilful (and wily) mind in its 
pursuit after knowledge (ή τον δντος θήρα), embodying the characteristics 
of the demonic eros (Symposium, 203d); within a premise which equates 
"love" with the active "lover" rather than the passive "beloved", verbs 
conveying action, almost to the point of "violation", accompany the 
Platonic act of knowledge, in contrast to the "spectator" metaphor of 
Berkeley. Even the moment of final encounter with true Being, a condition 
which entails stillness and inactivity, is described by Plato in terms of almost 
possessive aggressiveness (Symposium, 210d). Conversely, the passivity of 
the human individual before a higher authority, and specifically the authority 
of Authorship, is persistent throughout Siris as much as in Berkeley's earlier 
work: "The true inference is — that the self-thinking individual, or human 
person, is not the real author of those natural motions. And, in fact, no man 
blames himself if they are wrong, or values himself if they are right"; the 
slightest performance of the human person, such as music-playing for 
instance, is motivated "not from the musician himself' but "from some other 
Active intelligence"18. So the source of activity in Berkeley's conception of 
reality is a Mind other than human mind which becomes an unknown 
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recipient of the Other's creative performance. 
The presence of elements from Berkeley's philosophical positions in the 
thinking and poetry — or "poetic thought" — of the Romantics is easily 
detectable. The extent to which the Romantic poets treated Berkeley as a 
Platonist, or a medium through which the Platonic doctrines were infiltrated 
to modern times, or a mirror that, like so many others, presented a 
distorted version of the original Platonic text, remains a questionable issue, 
though. Wordsworth's acquaintance with Berkeley's work, especially 
through his association with Coleridge, is widely acknowledged19; what 
probably attracted Wordsworth (and Coleridge for that matter) to Berkeley, 
is his attempt to reconcile the Christian with the empiricist world views in a 
new scheme that would guarantee the validity of sensation as a source of 
knowledge, while retaining faith in the providential role of a Supreme Being. 
The resulting pattern of experience, which incorporates epistemologica! as 
well as emotionalist aspects, and establishes the thesis that human sense-data 
are produced by the will of a Divine intelligence, must have been an 
attractive, though imperfect, solution to the acute problematics that 
disturbed the Romantic thinkers, concerning the relation of mind-nature. By 
reducing the old triadic structure of God-Nature-Man to a bi-polar God-Man, 
Berkeley's model offers one possible answer to the Subject-Object 
interrelation that was the chief concern of the post-Kantian generation of 
philosophers and poets. The spiritualization of the material world, and the 
metaphor of nature-as-language are fundamental concepts with Wordsworth 
and Coleridge as with Berkeley. To what extent Wordsworth also accepted 
Berkeley's attendant presupposition, the passive receptivity of the human 
mind in its transactions with the Author of Nature in sensation, would need 
more detailed investigation. That he did not approve of Berkeley's position 
unreservedly, we know from his optimum reality model of "an active mind 
in an active universe", which may or may not contradict his equally well-
known dictum of "wise passiveness". 
Coleridge's contention that "Hartley was ousted by Berkeley, Berkeley 
by Spinoza, Spinoza by Plato"20, is supported by an incontestable 
biographical datum, the naming of his first son after Hartley and his second 
after Berkeley. Besides that, Berkeley was his favourite philosopher at least 
from 1796 to 1798, and apparently a major influence prior to his departure 
for Germany, which possibly paved the way for his attraction to Kantian 
philosophy21. Berkeley's deposition by Plato (via Spinoza) seems to 
contradict another statement of Coleridge's, that allows for a broad 
spectrum accommodating people and postulates conflicting with each other 
or mutually exclusive; referring to the times when " 'his metaphysical 
theories lay before him in the hour of anguish as toys by the bedside og a 
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child deadly sick', he turned again to 'Plato and the mystics, Locke, 
Berkeley, Descartes and Spinoza' "22. Muirhead attempts to justify the 
apparently ambivalent relation Berkeley bears to Plato in Coleridge's mind, 
by supporting that the "difficulty vanishes if we remember the difference 
between the earlier empirical Berkeley to whom esse is percipi and the later 
Platonic to whom esse is concipi, and that the discovery of this difference 
was itself one of the important steps in Coleridge's philosophical 
development"23. The implication is that Coleridge rejected the early 
"Lockean" Berkeley in favour of the late "Platonic" Berkeley; however, the 
presence of Locke's name in the second quotation alongside Plato's and 
Berkeley's, either indicates a (latent) correlation of the three philosophers, 
or makes of them an unusual company, unless their relationship is conceived 
in contradictory rather than conciliatory terms. 
Shelley could not have been a Berkeleyan, although it has often been 
claimed that he was24. The cornerstone of Berkeley's cognitive system, as 
pointed out, is theistic, and the reality of ideas or sense-data is guaranteed 
by a transcendent God whose authority and authorship constitute the 
ontological as well as the epistemologica! ground of human experience. This 
basic presupposition of Berkeley's theory and the well-known attitude of 
Shelley towards the God of tradition, resulting in the necessity of atheism, 
make it forbidding for Shelley to be a true disciple of Berkeley, despite 
Mary Shelley's conviction to the contrary. First, because, as Earl R. 
Wasserman argues, "without a Creator, Shelley has no ground for claiming 
that only regular, vivid, and constant ideas are real"25; second, and contrary 
to Notopoulos' view maintaining that the Platonism of Berkeley influenced 
Shelley who achieved a blending of the two philosophers"26, I mink that 
Shelley could not have been a Berkeleyan immaterialistic monist because he 
inclined towards being a (Platonic) realistic dualist - his epistemological 
model consisting of a "universe of things" flowing "through the mind" 
("Mont Blanc"). In a letter to Godwin dated 29 July 1812, Shelley presents a 
severe critique of Berkeley's premises, reluctant as he is to accept the 
turning of material reality into immateriality: 
Immateriality seems to me [to embody cancelled] nothing but a 
simple denial of the presence of matter, of the presence of all the 
forms of being with which our senses are acquainted, & it surely is 
somewhat inconsistent to assign real existence to what is a mere 
negation of all that actual world to which our senses introduce us. I 
have read Berkeley, & the perusal of his arguments tended more 
than anything to convince me that immaterialism & other words of 
general usage deriving all their force from mere predicates in non 
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were invented by the pride of philosophers to conceal their 
ignorance even from themselves27. 
In his introductory note to Shelley's "Essay on Life", David L. Clark 
obviously mistakes Shelley's position when he claims that, Shelley "has 
misunderstood Berkeley, for that philosopher did not deny the real existence 
of the external world: he merely asserts that we cannot .know that objects do 
exist; all the mind has is an image of the various sensible objects"28. Clark's 
misinterpretation concerning Shelley's attitude to Berkeley stems, I believe, 
from two causes: his own misreading of Berkeley, in that "we cannot know 
that objects do exist"; Berkeley's contention, on the contrary, is as 
affirmative as it could possibly be, and the existence of objects/ideas is 
absolutely authenticated by their prior sojourn in God's mind. It is also a 
distortion of Shelley's text, since the poet does not refer to Berkeley's 
hypothetical denial of the reality of the perceptual world, but of the 
existence of "matter"29. In attempting to make Shelley a Berkeleyan, Clark 
identifies Shelley's axiom, "the mind cannot create; it can only perceive", 
with Berkeley's esse ist percipi, without consideration of what is Berkeley's 
fundamental proposition, that the primary perception in the mind of God is 
a "creation", indeed; thus Shelley's dictum would appear to contradict the 
Berkeleyan tenet rather then support it. 
A similar misrepresentation is put forward by Mary Shelley, whose 
assessment in her preface to Shelley's Essays, Letters from Abroad, etc. 
published in 1840, reads: 
Shelley was a disciple of the immaterial philosophy of Berkeley. This 
theory gave unity and grandeur to his ideas, while it opened a wide 
field for his imagination. The creation, such as it was perceived by 
his mind — a unit in immensity, was slight and narrow compared 
with the interminable forms of thought that might exist beyond, to be 
perceived perhaps hereafter by his own mind: or which are 
perceptible to other minds that fill the universe, not of space in the 
material sense, but of infinity in the immaterial one30. 
If for Shelley, as Mary contends, the phenomenal universe was 
unsatisfactory, this is not Berkeley31 for whom the (human) sensible world is 
the very thinking of the transcendent (divine) Author, and who never 
underrates the validity of perception (nor does he, to my knowledge, allow 
for a direct viewing of "archetypes", human experience being limited to 
"ectypes"), but Plato, for whom the perceptual data are adulterated copies 
of transcendent Forms to be perceived by the "soul by itself' either in life or 
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afterlife (and certainly in pre-life, to complete the circle of generation). 
The precise nature of the relation between creativity and perception has 
been an agonizing question with Shelley and appears in a variety of contexts 
covering the whole span of his intellectual evolution. In the early 
"Refutation of Deism" (published in 1814), the Christian Eusebes arguing 
from atheist premises (Epicurus, Bacon, Newton, Locke, Hume) against the 
deist Theosophus, proclaims: "Mind cannot create, it can only perceive. 
Mind is the recipient of impressions made on the organs of sense, and 
without the action of external objects we should not only be deprived of all 
knowledge of the existence of mind but totally incapable of the knowledge 
of anything"32. In the "Treatise on Morals" (placed loosely between 1815 
and 1821, but most probably dating from 1812-15), the section on 
metaphysics (defined as an inquiry concerned with the "intenal nature of 
man"), opens with the following statement representing the fundamental 
tenets of empiricism — Shelley's degree of conimitment to such postulates 
remaining indefinable: "It is an axiom in mental philosophy that we can 
think of nothing which we have not perceived. When I say we can think of 
nothing, I mean, we can imagine nothing, we can reason of nothing, we can 
remember nothing, we can foresee nothing"33. 
In a "Philosophical View of Reform" (written in 1819-20), Shelley places 
the distinctive mark of the "new epoch" in philosophy (Bacon, Spinoza, 
Hobbes, Bayle, Montaigne) in its "deeper inquiries into the forms of human 
nature", and in a critical questioning of "popular systems of faith with 
respect to the cause and agencies of the universe"; then "with a less interval 
of time than of genius followed [Locke] and the philosophers of his exact 
and intelligible but superficial school", putting forth "inferences the most 
incompatible with the popular religions"; in their wake, "Berkeley, and 
Hume, [and] Hartley [at a] later age, following the traces of these inductions, 
have clearly established the certainty of our ignorance with respect to those 
obscure questions which under the name of religious truths have been the 
watch-words of contention and the symbols of unjust power"34. Here 
Berkeley is grouped with Hume and Hartley as an exponent of scepticism 
and a detractor of orthodox doctrines, instrumental in exploding the 
traditional theological body of established convictions. From this 
assumption, it is only a small step to translate the security and amplitude of 
Berkeley's ontological tenet "to be is to be perceived" (by God) into the 
insecurity and limitation of an epistemological proposition of "nothing 
exists but as it is perceived" (by man), which, read from the other side — 
"mind cannot create, it can only perceive" (and re-invested with 
metaphysical properties) — gives Shelley's model of Mind as the passive 
percipient of a creation caused by a Power other-than-mind. Shelley's 
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interest in the philosopher of immaterialism seems to originate more in that 
random critique inscribed as marginalia to Berkeley by the obscure poet 
Charles Lloyd, than in the thought of Berkeley himself: 
It would give me much pleasure to know Mr. Lloyd. Do you know 
when I was in Cumberland I got Southey to borrow a copy of 
Berkeley from him, and I remember observing some pencil notes in 
it, apparently written by Lloyd, which I thought particularly acute. 
One especially struck me as being the assertion of a doctrine of 
which even then I had long been persuaded regarding the imagined 
cause of the Universe. 'Mind cannot create; it can only perceive.' 
Ask him if he remembers having written it35. 
What remains to be examined is Shelley's own text of the "Essay on 
Life"36 where he actually appears twice as a convert to the Berkeleyan 
monistic system. In the fourth paragraph of the short piece (twelve 
paragraphs all in all) that undertakes to investigate the meaning of life and 
the mystery of being, appears for the first time the phrase "nothing exists 
but as it is perceived"37 (evidently a close version of the Berkeleyan tenet, 
"to be is to be perceived"); Shelley seems to offer his unwavering support to 
the fundamental concept of Berkeley's theory, in his polemic against what 
he calls "the popular philosophy of mind and matter" on the one hand, and 
"materialism" on the other. 
The most refined abstractions of logie conduct to a view of life 
which, though startling to the apprehension, is in fact that which the 
habitual sense of its repeated combinations has extinguished in us. It 
strips, as it were, the painted curtain from this scene of things. I 
confess that I am one of those who am unable to refuse my assent to 
those philosophers who assert that nothing exists but as it is 
perceived38. 
In the developement of Shelley's argument, two things become dinstinct: 
that his own philosophical evolution proceeded from a rejection of the 
popular philosophy of "mind-and-matter" (British empiricism) to the 
acceptance of "matter" (French materialism), which doctrine was in its turn 
found unsatisfactory; then he goes on to inform us that both the above 
systems were forbiddingly irrelevant to his own contemplations, which he 
ultimately found consistent with what he calls "the intellectual system"39. 
One controversial point concerns Shelley's references to the various 
philosophical schools which enter into the formation of his own thinking: the 
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popular philosophy of mind and matter (which Clark specifies as "the so-
called intellectual philosophy advocated by Locke, Hume, Hartley, 
Priestley"), materialism (attributed to the French thinkers Holbach and 
Cabanis), and the intellectual system, whose "most clear and rigorous 
statement", Shelley claims, "is to be found in Sir William Drummond's 
Academical Questions"40. The content of Shelley's notion of "materialism" 
being fairly obvious, this leaves us with the confrontation (and they are 
meant to be seen as opposite and mutually exclusive systems of thinking) 
between the "empirical system" (i.e. the popular philosophy of mind and 
matter or, in Clark's explanation, "intellectual philosophy") and the 
"intellectual system". Which of the two constellations does Berkeley belong 
to? 
Furthermore, Shelley's confession of assent to the theories of those 
philosophers who assert that nothing exists but as it is perceived, is tainted 
by verbal ambiguity manifest in an acceptance that is in fact a double 
negation ("am unable to refuse"); also, a subtle irony, it seems to me, plays 
around a "view of life" mat "strips the painted curtain from the scene of 
things" and liberates from "habitual sense", but is also the result of the "most 
refined abstractions of logic" (his reservations concerning both 
"abstractions" and "logic" being emphatically pronounced throughout his 
work). Shelley's endorsement of such "conclusions", he admitts, has been a 
"decision" made against "all our persuasions", voicing an enforcement of 
equivocal nature, in that "we must long be convicted before we can be 
convinced that the solid universe of external things is 'such stuff as dreams 
are made of "41. This could be Berkeleyan immaterialism, but also Lockean 
epistemology (the veil-of-perception doctrine). Hence, the sentence 
immediatelly following, which ridicules the "shocking absurdities of the 
popular philosophy of mind and matter, its fatal consequences in morals, 
and their violent dogmatism concerning the source of all tilings", could as 
easily include Berkeley as exclude him. 
Since "the popular philosophy of mind and matter" is the tradition 
stemming from Locke, Berkeley could be enlisted under its auspices; and the 
statement that "nothing exists but as it is perceived", interpreted in a 
broader perspective, certainly advocates the empirical thesis of the 
phenomenal nature of reality from the standpoint of the human observer. So, 
to consider Shelley's "intellectual system" as Berkeley's "immaterialism" 
(with the indisputably centralized authority of the Author of Nature whose 
"ideas" are human "perceptions") seems to me highly improbable. Shelley, 
giving us the nucleus of his own metaphysical and moral premises, contends 
that, 
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man is a being of high aspirations, "looking both before and after," 
whose "thoughts wander through eternity," disclaiming alliance with 
transience and decay; incapable of imagining to himself annihilation; 
existing but in the future and the past; being, not what he is, but what 
he has been and shall be. Whatever may be his true and final 
destination, there is a spirit within him at enmity with nothingness 
and dissolution. This is the characteristic of all life and being. Each is 
at once the centre and the circumference, the point to which all 
things are referred, and the line in which all things are contained. 
Such contemplations as these, materialism and the popular 
philosophy of mind and matter alike forbid; they are only consistent 
with the intellectual system42 
Can Berkeley be considered an advocate of this "intellectual system"? If 
we judge by the content Shelley gives to mis theory, looking upon man as "a 
being of high aspirations", the focal point for all creation — a view basically 
following the humanistic tradition ( or perhaps the transcendentalist) — 
nothing could be farther from the Berkeleyan theocratic model of reality, 
centralized as it is upon God who "imprints" life and being on man, the 
passive recipient. The only way that the above proposition could be thought 
of as inspired by Berkeley, is by translating "each" (man) into an "author" 
of nature, writing his own "text" of perception, in a Self- (and not 
Other/God) referential existence; thus, however, perceprion would become a 
human rather than a divine act of (imaginative) creation, and that, of course, 
precludes Shelley from being a disciple of Berkeley. And if we forget for a 
moment the epistemologica! problem and concentrate on the conceptual 
model of man mat Shelley presents, the "each is at once the centre and the 
circumference", then we are confronted with a (Romantic) mind that 
"authorizes" individualism and (human) "thought" which becomes "the 
measure of the universe" (Prometheus Unbound., Π, iv, 73)43 — though not 
its generator. So Berkeley seems to be "suspended" between the two 
systems. And although Shelley uses expressions that have a Berkeleyan 
register, his unquestionable rejection of an authoritative Author of creation 
debars any easy adoption of the basic premise of Berkeley's creed. The poet 
is simply putting the philosopher's words to his own usage, emptying them 
of their original content. Doesn't he, after all, in this very essay, speak of 
"words and signs" as the "instruments" of mental creation44, and the 
difficulty of finding terms "adequate to express so subtle a conception as 
that to which the intellectual Philosophy has conducted us"45? 
The two crucial propositions, "Nothing exists but as it is perceived", and, 
"Mind cannot create, it can only perceive"46, seem at least contradictory, 
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although they are only three paragraphs apart. The first, as we have seen, 
sounds close to the Berkeleyan notion of the creation of phenomenal things 
taking place in the mind of the Author of Nature; the second could again be 
interpreted as the Berkeleyan thesis applied to the human mind; the two 
together might be incorporated in a statement denoting something like this: 
"Nothing exists but as it is perceived/created/imagined in the Divine Mind; 
human mind cannot create, it can only perceive what has already been 
perceived by God"47. The problem that Shelley's line of thinking presents, as 
Wasserman points out, is that the poet rejects on theological grounds the 
belief in a "Creator Mind that governs its creation"48, which inevitably 
writes out the possibility that the first "perceived" refers to a Divine Mind, 
whereas the second "perceive" to human mind. What may be a plausible 
interpretation of the antithetical statements is to reverse the subjects of the 
two sentences, which would result in the following reading: (Divine) "Mind 
cannot create, it can only perceive"; it cannot be the cause of life, as 
religion instructs us, nor an agent distinct from life, acting upon life. 
Shelley's conclusive proposition is in perfect agreement with such an 
interpretation: "It is infinitely improbable that the cause of mind, that is, of 
existence, is similar to mind"49. Thus Shelley appears to reject, quite in the 
manner that Wasserman charts, the notion of the popular philosophy (or 
theology) — to which we could be justified now to include Berkeley — that 
Mind is the ultimate cause of life. The self-referential and solopsistic 
undertones that obviously accompany the interpretation that "nothing exists 
but as it is perceived" (by human mind) are noted by Wasserman, who 
formulates the central questions of Shelley's lifelong inquiry into the nature 
of "life", as, "Is there a substantive reality independent of the mind? Or is 
the 'external' world only the mind's perceptions? Is there a sense in which 
all the thoughts of the mind are real existences?"so. 
What, I believe, happens is that Shelley rejects the "truth" of empiricism 
while endorsing its "method", i.e. its critical/sceptical attitude which 
"destroys error and the roots of error". The mode of Shelley's "intellectual 
system" is essentially negative, creative in being destructive; the human 
mind in its "Copernican" role of being "the centre and circumference", is 
reduced to an existentialist freedom of acting, and re-creating words and 
signs after it has been vacated and relieved from customary beliefs. "Our 
whole life is an education of error"51, Shelley proclaims, emphasizing that 
the cognitive process necessarily passes through a "deconstructive" stage of 
violent scepticism, which leads (as in Platonic dialectic) to knowledge 
through knowledge of ignorance. 
This second appearance of "Nothing exists but as it is perceived" is 
incorporated into a discussion on "unity", a view of life "presented by the 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 22:16:44 |
32 E. Douka Kabitoglou 
most refined deductions of the intellectual philosophy", where Shelley finds 
only a nominal differentiation between "ideas" and "external objects". He 
starts from a recollection of powerful childhood sensations and proceeds to 
the adult condition of "reverie", when due to the intensity of experience 
men become "conscious of no distinction" between self and world, and "feel 
as if their nature were dissolved into the sunOunding universe, or as if the 
surrounding universe were absorbed into their being"; such are states of 
mind , he continues, "which precede, or accompany, or follow an unusually 
intense and vivid apprehension of life"52. Shelley collapses not only the 
distinction between "ideas" and "objects", but also finds the "existence of 
distinct individual minds" (as the common assumption is) "to be a delusion", 
and "the words I, you, they" as mere signs denoting "the different 
modifications of the one mind"53. Wasserman interprets the above position 
as yet another reinforcement of the view that , "since his rejecting the 
doctrine of a Creator and accepting the universe as eternal, Shelley had been 
inclined toward a belief that all individual minds are subsumed in a universal 
mind, and his impulse at all times appears to have been to dissolve 
individual identity in an all-encompassing unity"54. Wasserman refers to 
what he describes as Shelley's "monistic idealism", his identification of the 
"one Mind with Existence", and recognizes an essential paradox in that 
whereas the "intellectual philosophy" does not "make the ordinary 
phenomenal world any less illusory", yet it "allows the indisputably present 
phenomena to serve as the means of an imaginative leap from the realm of 
Existence to the realm of Being on which it depends"55. 
Wassermann statement that, the "universal Mind is the same as Existence 
according to the 'intellectual philosophy,' and all human minds are factors 
of it"56 does not easily correlate with a theory of visual deception. And his 
assertion that, in spite of "the obvious fascination the Platonic dialogues had 
for Shelley, it is both unnecessary and misleading in structuring his ontology 
to introduce Platonism, from which it differs in radical ways"57 is an unfair 
— to say the least — treatment of Shelley's suggestions as to how his works 
should be approached, in favour of Mary's58. "Shelley's philosophic 
evolution", Wasserman clarifies, "followed the logical course from the 
empiricism that was his native heritage to scepticism and men, dodging the 
implicit solipsism, to an objective idealism dependent upon a non-theistic 
and nontranscendental Absolute"; but although the poet "structured his 
ontology in his own special ways, it shares the characteristics of almost all 
idealisms in such essentials as the distinctions between appearance and 
reality, diversity and unity, thing and idea"59. Yet it is precisely in what are 
the common characteristics of all idealisms — and some materialisms, too — 
i.e. the existence of a reality that cannot be detected by perceptual 
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consciousness, where Plato, Christianity, the Neoplatonists, Berkeley, 
Kant, the post-Kantians (to remain within the sphere of western 
metaphysics) present their most fundamental contradictions and 
irreconcilable positions — which makes for a plurality of "idealisms" as a 
source of conflicting ontological notions in-forming Shelley's own 
philosophical speculations60. 
That neither Berkeley was a Platonist, nor Shelley a Berkeleyan, has been 
recognized by a number of critics61. G. S. Brett contends that the 
"immaterial philosophy of Berkeley was not strictly platonic: it was nearer 
to some forms of neoplatonism and has a somewhat indefinite relation to the 
whole history of idealism"62. C. E. Pulos has argued in favour of the obvious 
antithesis in the two thinkers' concept of reality, emphasizing that Shelleyan 
idealism views ultimate reality as unknown and differing from mind, whereas 
for Berkeley mind (Divine Mind) is "the basis of all things"63. In 
interpreting the same lines from Shelley's essay "On Life", that, "Mind 
cannot create, it can only perceive", Pulos contests that, "Shelley's 'the one 
mind' appears to be not a metaphysical but a psychological concept, 
analogous to Jung's well known theory of collective unconscious.' It refers, 
at all events, to something less than 'the basis of all things' ',64. 
To the persistent question of why Shelley refused to accept the 
Berkeleyan concept of reality as mind, Pulos offers a "plausible conjecture", 
the fact that Shelley found in Berkeley's doctrine "some suggestion of an 
anthropomorphic theology, which he viewed with repugnance"; and with a 
penetrating insight that takes us right to the heart of the problem, he claims 
that, there is "nothing in Shelley's references to Berkeley to indicate that 
Berkeley ever impressed the poet. Critics have been able to conclude 
otherwise only by misinterpreting Sir William Drummond, whose 
'Intellectual Philosophy' Shelley embraced, as Berkeley's disciple"65; to 
which I would add, at least on the evidence given earlier in this paper, Mary 
Shelley's misled — and misleading — identification of Shelley's "idealism" 
with "immaterialism". Pulos' conclusion on the nature of Shelley's idealism, 
which makes of the poet a negative Berkeleyan and a positive Platonist66, 
raises a number of other issues concerning the three thinkers' concepts of 
reality: "Shelley was still at liberty, of course, to formulate a theory of either 
feeling or probability, and in this manner to pass from the doctrine that 
denies the independent existence of phenomena to the doctrine that 
identifies reality with mind. But there is no evidence mat he did so. Shelley 
tends toward the idealism of Plato through a kind of 'sceptical solution to 
doubt'", Pulos confirms, closing his discussion with a definitive statement, 
that it is impossible for Shelley to "accept Berkeley's concept of reality as 
mind, even upon the most tentative grounds \ 
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The central position occupied by Drummond in Shelley's thinking and 
reading has been recognized by modern criticism; one could even support 
the thesis that "Drummond may be looked upon as one of the sources of 
Shelley's Platonism"68. The question is, which Platonism? Idealistic 
Platonism that "served as a magnet to draw Shelley away from materialism 
to Plato", and even acted as "an incentive for Shelley to read Plato 
directly"69; Platonic daemonology70; or sceptical Platonism, scepticism 
being what "prepared the way for Shelley's acceptance of Plato and at the 
same time rendered inevitable his basic divergence from Plato"71. In any 
case, Drummond is considered as the conciliatory ground for British 
empirical philosophy and Platonism, in the conjuction of Locke-and-Plato, 
or in the fusion of Plato and Hume under the auspices of scepticism, of 
which both philosophers partake (though in a different measure and with 
different objectives). Consequently, Pulos maintains that the "sceptical 
tradition prepared the way for Shelley's acceptance of Plato by resolving the 
objection to Plato held by the philosophes and by depicting Plato as a kind 
of sceptic himself — or as, at least, a forerunner of scepticism"72. 
Concerning the possibility of integration of the Lockean and Platonic tenets, 
John Laird looks upon Drummond's work as "an anti-materialistic 
phenomenalism" which "did not despair of the possibility of building a bridge 
between Locke and Plato"; indeed, Laird continues offering an illustration 
from Drummond's work to support this unorthodox contention: "in a 
prominent place, namely, in a footnote to his preface, he remarked: Ί 
cannot indeed, comprehend any thing, which is neither a sensation nor 
obtained from one; I do not, however, on that account, deny the existence 
of divine intelligible ideas, as these are explained to be possible'"73. 
Drummond seems to be quite aware of the precise nature of Plato's 
dualistic conception of reality74, which renders it possible for him to be both 
an idealist, i.e. a believer in the supremacy and knowability of the "ideal" 
world, and a sceptic (precisely in the way empiricists like Locke and Hume 
were), concerning the unknowability of corporeal reality: "Plato, in 
speaking of the primary matter, from which modern philosophers have 
borrowed their doctrine concerning material substance, observes, that it is a 
question dubiously to be understood, and difficult to be comprehended'75. 
Drummond's own kind of scepticism, however, goes beyond Plato's and 
reveals its affiliations with contemporary speculations, in denying not only 
the intellegibility of matter (which is the Platonic position), but its very 
"existence", which is both the Berkeleyan premise (leading to an all-
inclusive spiritual view of reality), and the Humean (implying an all-
inclusive "agnostic" attitude). Drummond's motives concerning the "denial" 
of matter, however, are the exact opposite to Berkeley's; whereas 
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Berkeleyan immaterialism establishes "authority" as external to man, 
Drummond's incorporeality (in Plato's fashion) questions "authority" and 
establishes "doubt" as the presupposition against "necessitarian causality": 
It may be asked how I account for sensations, if I question the 
existence of a material substratum'! . . . To assign causes for every-
thing has been the vain attempt of ignorance in every age. It has 
been by encouraging this error, that superstition has enslaved the 
world. In proportion as men are rude, uncultivated, and uncivilized, 
they are determined in their opinions, bold in their presumptions 
and obstinate in their prejudices. When they begin to doubt, it may 
be concluded, they begin to be refined. The savage is seldom a 
sceptic — the barbarian is rarely incredulous76. 
The target of Drummond's sceptical attitude to free the mind from 
subjugation to superstition, credulity, received opinions, i.e. authority-as-
otherness, is basically Platonic (but Lockean as well). "Intellectual 
philosophy" confers upon the human mind the freedom to investigate reality, 
divorced from the secure anchorage in divine authority (whether it be 
Berkeley's Author of Nature or the Christian God); the counterpart of such 
liberty is the uncertainty and insecurity that attends the unaided intellect 
(fallen into "a violent distrust" of all that was 'formerly held true" [Republic, 
Vu, 539c]), in its awareness that the hermeneutics of the real rests on man's 
own creative activity, which may very well be a "vision", but it might 
equally well be a "dream". In his moments of confidence in the power of 
human intelligence, Shelley endows it with an imaginative pienti tu de, a 
"wondrous vision" (Symposium, 210d) that Plato placed within the mind's 
potential, and Berkeley reserved for the mind of God only — as for instance 
in his masterful (rhetorical) question addressed to transcendent Power, which 
inconclusively concludes the epistemologica! complexities of "Mont Blanc": 
And what were thou, and earth, and stars and sea, 
If to the human mind's imaginings 
Silence and solitude were vacancy? 
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NOTES 
1. Jonathan Bennet interprets Berkeley's idealistic solution as the only alternative 
to the Lockean "veil-of-perception" theory (Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes 
[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971], p. 145). 
2. For the indebtedness of Berkeley's theory to Neoplatonic and Christian views, see 
Peter S. Wenz, "Berkeley's Christian Neopiatonism", Journal of the History of Ideas 37 
(1976), 537-46. 
3. In his Preface to the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley 
announces the objective of his philosophical endeavour, being that "atheism and 
scepticism will be utterly destroyed" (ed. Robert M. Adams [Indianapolis and 
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1979] p. 4). 
4. For a discussion of the consequences attending upon Berkeley's modified 
adoption of Locke's model, see A. D. Nuttall, A Common Sky: Philosophy and the 
Literary Imagination (London: Chatto & Windus, 1974), pp. 38-39. 
5. "Berkeley realized", Paul J. Olscamp argues, that "the impersonal cause we can 
infer as a necessary entity is not satisfactory as a concept of God, at least as seen 
through Christian eyes" (The Moral Philosophy of George Berkeley [The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970] p. 110). 
6. The Principles of Human Knowledge; Three Dialogues between Hylas and 
Pbilonus, ed. G. J. Warnock (1962; Glasgow: Collins/Fontana, 1979), 30. 
7. Ibid., 33. 
8. How removed such a notion is from Shelley's attitude to mental operation 
becomes evident in the following extract from his 'Treatise on Morals", which endows 
the reflective activity with a power that is akin to Platonic "recollection": 'The caverns 
of the mind are obscure and shadowy; or pervaded with a lustre, beautifully bright 
indeed, but shining not beyond their portals. If it were possible to be where we have 
been, vitally and indeed — if, at the moment of our presence there, we could define the 
results of our experience — if the passage from sensation to reflection — from a state 
of passive perception to voluntary contemplation were not so dizzying and so 
tumultuous, this attempt would be less difficult" (Shelley's Prose, or the Trumpet of a 
Prophesy, ed. David L. Clark, corr. edn [1954; Albuquerque: The University of New 
Mexico Press, 1966], p. 186). 
9. More specifically, "the author of nature communicates with us, using a language 
or system of signs (the ideas of truth, sight, sound, etc.)" (Robert L. Armstrong, 
Metaphysics and British Empiricism [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970], p. 
133). 
10. All references to Plato's text are to The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith 
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). For a 
presentation of the opposite view originating in the realization that sometimes Plato 
"uses language which lends itself to the interpretation that the ideas are the thoughts of 
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God", and a diachronic examination of such an attitude, see Harry A. Wolfson, 
"Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas", Journal of the History 
of Ideas 22 (1961), 3-32. 
11. John Wild, George Berkeley: A Study of His Life and Philosophy (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1936), pp. 66-67. 
12. The Principles of Human Knowledge, 30. 
13. The Works of George Berkeley, ed. Alexander C. Fraser, 4 vols (Oxford: At the 
Clarendon Press, 1901), III, 118. 
14. Berkeley's mode of Platonism as presented in Siris is inevitably conditioned by 
his early system of immaterialism. The sequence that forms the structural pattern of 
Siris, whose full title is SMs: A Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inqutrìes 
Concerning the Virtues of Tar Water, And divers other Subjects connected together 
and arising one from another, is precisely an all-inclusive Chain of Being, from the 
lowest manifestation of reality (Tar Water) to the Godhead itself. 
15. The Works of George Berkeley, m, 119. 
16. Berkeley's basic misrepresentation of the Platonic model is, I think, that he 
translates Plato's proposition concerning the "unknowability" of the second cause into 
a theory supporting the "non-existence" of matter, thus substituting (precisely as the 
Neoplatonists had done) "negation" or "absence" where Plato had detected "otherness" 
(The Works of George Berkeley, m, 277). 
17. The Works of George Berkeley, m, 245. 
18. Ibid., ΠΙ, 246. 
19. See Ellen D. Leyburn, "Berkeleian Elements in Wordsworth's Thought", Journal 
of English and Germanic Philology 47 (1948), 14-28. 
20. Quoted in John H. Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher (London: George Allen & 
Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1930), p. 46. 
21. James V. Baker, The Sacred River: Coleridge's Theory of the Imagination (1957; 
New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 22-23. 
22. Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher, p. 46. 
23. Ibid., p. 46. 
24. Shelley's interest in Berkeley was initiated by Robert Southey in 1811 during the 
poet's visits in Southey's house at Keswick; the copy of Berkeley's works that Shelley 
borrowed from Southey "was the property of Charles Lloyd, and Shelley "was too much 
the disciple of Locke and the sensational philosophy to be impressed by Berkeley as 
much as by a very un-Berkeleyan pencilled note of Lloyd's: 'Mind cannot create, it can 
only perceive'" (Newman I. White, Shelley, 2 vols [1940; New York: Octagon Books, 
1972], I, 184); on the evidence of Shelley's prose fragment "On Life", however, 
probably written in 1815, White is prepared to accept that "by this time Shelley had 
abandoned Locke for Berkeley, whom he had rejected in 1812" (p. 424). A similar view 
is held by Neville Rogers informing us that whereas in 1812 Shelley "was still full of the 
doctrines of the eighteenth-century materialist philosophers and could see nothing but 
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word-juggling in the immaterialist doctrines of Berkeley", between 1812 and 1815 he 
became thoroughly converted to Berkeley from whom, it may well be, he imbibed 
indirectly quite as much Platonism at the time as from his direct Platonic study then 
being fostered by Peacock" (SheUey at Work: A Critical Inquiry [Oxford: At the 
Clarendon Press, 1956], p. 122). James A Notopoulos, however, places the date of the 
essay "On Life" not earlier than 1819 ("The Dating of Shelley's Prose", PMLA 58 
[1943], 489-91). 
25. Shelley: A Crìtical Reading (1971; Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977), p. 144. 
26. James A. Notopoulos, The Platonism of Shelley: A Study of Platonism and the 
Poetic Mind (1949; New York: Octagon Books, 1969), pp. 121-26. 
27. The Letters of Percy Bussbe Shelley, ed. Frederick L. Jones, 2 vols (Oxford: At 
the Clarendon Press, 1964), I, 316. 
28. Prose, p. 171. Clark elsewhere gives us an account of references in Shelley's 
letters and other writings of the period (1810-13), where it appears that monism (in 
both its versions of materialism and immateriallism) is found unsatisfactory: " Ί have 
long been convinced of the eternal omnipotence of mind over matter,' (October 12, 
1811?). 'Every day makes me feel more keenly that our being is eternal . . . how 
inadequate are reasonings to demonstrate it,' (December 11, 1811). 'Words are only 
signs of ideas . . . Southey agrees in my idea of Deity, the mass of infinite intelligence . . 
. I, you, and he, are constituent parts of this immense whole,' (January 2, 1812)"; Clark 
also notes that an "examination of other productions written by Shelley during this 
period", establishes Shelley's interest in the same questions "of materialism and 
immaterialism, of the nature of matter, of his early crude materialism, and how 
philosophy had failed to answer his doubts, and how finally he came to the conclusion 
that God, the spirit of the universe, did exist, and in consequence the soul of man" 
("The Dates and Sources of Shelley's Metaphysical, Moral, and Religious Essays", 
University of Texas Studies in English 28 [1949], 190). 
29. Amiyakumar Sen, in his tracing of philosophical influences on Shelley's 
metaphysics, emphatically asserts the contrast between Berkeley's and Plato's attitudes 
to the material worid (Studies in Shelley [1936; New York: The Foicroft Press, 1969], 
pp. 252-53). 
30. Quoted in G. S. Brett, "Shelley's Relation to Berkeley and Drummond", in 
Studies in English by Members of University College, Toronto, ed. M. W. Wallace 
(Toronto, 1931), p. 172. 
31. Joseph Barrell characterizes Mary Shelley's remark "unfortunate", arguing that 
"it is doubtful if it can be applied to any of Shelley's poetry" (Shelley and the Thought 
of His Time: A Study in the History of Ideas [New Haven: Yale University Press, 
194η, p. 124) 
32. Prose, p. 136. 
33. Ibid., p. 182. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 22:16:44 |
Shelley and Berkeley 39 
34. Ibid., pp. 232-33. 
35. Ih his letter to Leigh Hunt, September 27, 1819 (Letteis, IL 122-23). 
36. For a reading of the essay as "Shelley's first definite announcement of his 
rejection of a materialistic philosophy and adoption of a spiritual 'intellectual system"', 
see Frederick L. Jones, "Shelley's On Life", PMLA 62 (1947), 774-83. 
37. Prose, p. 173. 
38. Ibid., p. 173. 
39. Ibid., p. 173. 
40. Ibid., p. 173. It is apparent, I think, that what Shelley calls "intellectual system" 
does not quite coincide with what Clark calls "intellectual philosophy" to define 
Shelley's "popular philosophy of mind and matter". 
41. Ibid., p. 173. 
42. Ibid., p. 173. 
43. All references to Shelley's poetry are to the Poetical Works, ed. Thomas 
Hutchinson, corr. edn G. M. Matthews (1905; 1943; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1970). 
44. Prose, p. 173. 
45. Ibid., p. 174. 
46. Ibid., p. 174. 
47. Joseph W. Beach supports the thesis that Shelley "seems to have adopted the 
Berkeleian analysis of objective reality in terms of thought, but to have balked at 
Berkeley's view of active mind (or God) as the spring of the universe", such a premise 
being inconsistent with his "non-theistic position" (The Concept of Nature in 
Nineteenth-Century English Poetry [1936; New York: Russell & Russell, 1966], p. 589). 
48. SheUey, p. 132. 
49. Awe, p. 175. 
50. SheUey, p. 134. 
51. Prose, pp. 173-74. 
52. Ibid., p. 174. 
53. Ibid., p. 174. 
54. SheUey, p. 146. 
55. Ibid., p. 153. 
56. Ibid., p. 147. 
57. Ibid., p. 147. 
58. Wasserman often seeks confirmation of his reading of Shelley in Mary Shelley's 
insights into her husband's work, probably not always an infallible guide through the 
labyrinth of the poet's thought. He also invokes Mary's authority in detecting a 
convergence between the "Immaterial Philosophy" and Shelley's "intellectual 
philosophy" (SheUey, p. 152). Thus Wasserman — and Mary — join together what, I 
believe, Shelley tried to keep asunder. 
59. SheUey, p. 147. 
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60. Barrell is critical of the "looseness of the criticism that has been showered upon 
the idealism" of Shelley's poetry, Plato and Berkeley being the obvious sources, with 
Spinoza and Drummond following not far behind; what is in fact needed, Barrell 
proposes, is a "survey of the various idealisms upon which Shelley's poetry is said to 
rest" (SheUey and the Thought of His Time, p. 121). 
61. The opposite view, which "marries" the Platonic and the Berkeleyan aspects of 
Shelley's so called idealism, is held, among others, by George S. Bower of the late 
nineteenth century, who finds in Shelley's work "the reasoned tenets of Berkeley" 
together with "Plato's eagle spirit" ("The Philosophical Element in SheUey", The 
Journal of Speculative PbUosophy 14 [1880], 429). 
62. "Shelley's Relation to Berkeley and Drummond", p. 174. 
63. The Deep Truth: A Study of SheUey's Scepticism (1954; Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1962), p. 108. 
64. Ibid., p. 53. P. M. S. Dawson also disclaims the indebtedness of Shelley to 
Berkeley, supporting that "it would be wrong to assume that Shelley shares Berkeley's 
concerns", his interest being less "in abstuse metaphysical questions than in their moral 
implications" (The Unaknowledged Legislator. SheUey and PoUtics [Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980], pp. 107-108). 
65. Ibid., p. 53. 
66. For discussions of Shelley's Platonism see Lilian M. Winstanley, "Platonism in 
Shelley", Essays and Studies 4 (1913), 72-100; Ross G. Woodman, "Shelley's Changing 
Attitude to Plato", Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (1960), 497-510; William J. 
McTaggart, "Some New Inquiries into Shelley's Platonism", Keats-SheUey Memorial 
BuUetin 21 (1970), 41-59. 
67. The Deep Truth, p. 52. 
68. Notopoulos, The Platonism of SheUey, p. 151. 
69. Ibid., p. 151. 
70. Ibid., pp. 14849. 
71. Pulos, The Deep Truth, p. 69. 
72. Ibid., p. 69. 
73. Philosophical Incursions into English Literature (1946; New York: Rüssel & 
RusseU, 1962), p. 121. 
74. That Plato's reality model is strongly dualistic (or even pluralistic) is supported 
by modern scholars, one of the most articulate and forceful voices being that of 
Raphael Demos arguing that "Plato's whole bent is anti-monistic" (The PhUosophy of 
Plato [1939; New York: Octagon Books, 1966], p. 124). 
75. Quoted in Notopoulos, The Platonism of SheUey, p. 150. 
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